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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a civil action dealing with the modification 
of a divorce decree provision regardinq the disposition of 
real property. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY THE LOWER COURT 
Subsequent to the entry of a Decre^ of Divorce in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah (JTounty/ defendant 
initiated an Order to Show Cause proceeding seeking modifica-
tion of a Stipulation and the Decree provision relative to 
the real property of the parties. The lower court modified 
the Decree to require the plaintiff to pay to the defendant 
$70 per month rental on the family hom^. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT Old APPEAL 
The plaintiff seeks reversal of the lower courtfs order 
I 
and requests that the parties1 financial obligations be 
returned to their former status/ thereby eliminating the 
imposition of the rental payment upon the plaintiff. 
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FACTS 
This matter initially came before Jthe Fourth District Court c 
I 
the 29th day of July, 1981. A Decree of Divorce was entered as 
between the parties on the 21st day of August, 1981. Pursuant to 
agreements and stipulations made between the parties tc the actioi 
and based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entere* 
by the Court, paragraph 9 of the Decrep of Divorce provides as 
follows: 
The plaintiff is awarded thel possession- of the 
family home of the parties for a period of five 
(5) years. From five (5) ydars from the date 
of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, the 
plaintiff is given the option to purchase the 
family home of the parties by paying to the 
defendant the sum of $18,500.00. In the event 
the plaintiff chooses not to purchase the 
family home of the parties then the defendant 
is given the option to purchase the family home 
of the parties by paying to the plaintiff the 
sum of $18,500.00. In the jevent neither the 
plaintiff nor the defendant choses [sic] to 
purchase the family home of the parties, the 
home is ordered to be sold and all obligations 
owed on the home and costs incident towards the 
sale of the home satisfied, and the proceeds 
derived therefrom divided equally between the 
plaintiff and the defendant. 
The defendants equity was thus predetermined. 
Paragraph 5(h) of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
entered concurrently with the Divorce Decree stated that in 
conjunction with her possession of the family home, the plaintiff 
was required to pay the first and second mortgage payments thereon, 
Less than one year later, on July 26, 1982, an Order to Show 
Cause was issued by the Court having been initiated by the 
defendant. In its Affidavit seeking the Order, the defendant 
alleged, as a change of circumstances, that the plaintiff had 
remarried and the defendant was in need of his equity from the 
home. It sought an order from the Court to force the sale of the 
home or force the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of 
$18,500.00, his equity in the home. 
On September 29, 1983, the Court denied the defendant's 
request stating: 
In this matter the Court does not find a 
sufficient compelling reason to modify the 
stipulation entered into at the time of the 
divorce. Using the case of 
Foulger v. Foulger, 626 P.2d 412, as a guide, 
the Court finds in the case at hand that the 
parties at the time of the stipulation were 
both represented by counsel, that the 
stipulation was the product of an agreement 
-2-
between the parties. The parties were 
questioned by the Court and they indicated that 
they understood the stipulation/ that both were 
dating and in fact considering remarriage, and 
finally, that the stipulation was approved by 
the Court. The Court havinglbeen the Trial 
Court on the Foulger Case felt that stronger 
compelling reasons existed in that case than 
does exist in the evidence presented in the 
case now before the Court. There is no 
evidence that the property has deteriorated 
but, in fact, has been improved. Accordingly, 
the Court denies defendant's Motion'to Modify 
Divorce Decree with respect to the real 
property. 
In that same decision, pursuant tb the request of the 
defendant, the Court granted him the custody of the couple1s mine 
son and deleted his support payments tjo the plaintiff with respec 
to the son. 
Only three months later, once ag^in upon the initiation of t 
defendant, an Order to Show Cause was issued by the Fourth 
District Court seeking an order that tfhe plaintiff pay to the 
defendant 1/2 of the fair rental value of the home and secondly • 
seeking child support from the plaintiff in the sum of $130.00 t< 
be paid to the defendant for the care of the minor son, Jeff, 
whose custody he had sought and gained in the previous Order to 
Show Cause hearing. For a change of hircumstances warranting su 
an order, the defendant alleged essentially the same things as h 
I 
had in the previous affidavit; that the plaintiff was remarried, 
that his income was insufficient for his needs and, additionally 
that he now had the care and custody of the minor son. 
-3-
Once again the Court found that a sufficient change in 
circumstances had not been demonstrated to warrant any modification 
of the decree. 
About 8 months later/ the defendant/ for the third time/ 
petitioned the Court for an Order to modify the Decree and require 
the plaintiff to pay to the defendant the reasonable rental value 
of the home. The defendant again alleged the plaintiff's 
remarriage and the defendant's reduced income as the changed 
circumstances warranting modification. Additionally he alleged 
that because of the plaintiff having paid off the second mortgage/ 
he was entitled to receive rent payments from her for living in the 
home . 
Contrary to its prior findings and rulings/ the Court, upon 
the third hearing, decided that these occurrences were indeed 
tantamount to a material change in circumstances "not contemplated 
at the time of the stipulation between the parties/ namely/ the 
remarriage of Mrs. Peterson and the retiring of the second 
mortgage upon the property..." 
Based thereon/ the Court ordered the plaintiff to pay the 
defendant the sum of $70.00 rental on the home while occupied by 
her. 
The plaintiff alleges that such a Finding and Order was a 
clear abuse of the Court's discretion and thus appeals. 
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POINT I 
UTAH LAW IS CLEAR THAT A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE OF 
MATERIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IS REQUIRED IN ORDER 
TO JUSTIFY THE MODIFICATION OF AN 
ORIGINAL DIVORCE DECREE. 
t to modify a Divorce Deere 
he modification demonstrate 
e time of the original 
Under Utah law# for the trial couri 
it is required that the party seeking t 
that the circumstances prevailing at th 
decree have undergone a substantial change/ that such changes are 
material and that the nature of the changes warrant a modificatioi 
See Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.id 1297 (Utah 1981), 
Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 10&0 (Utah 1978), 
Zaharias v. Zaharias, 652 P.2d 1312 (Utah 1982). 
the Utah Supreme Court as 
|v. Cody, 47 Utah 456, 154 P 
This requirement was set forth by 
early as 1916, when the Court in Cody 
952, at 957 stated: 
I have no doubt that, under the statute, when 
judicial action is properly invoked, the Court, 
as to orders which relate to alimony, custody 
of children, and award for their support, when 
they are continuing and over which the Court 
retains a continuing jurisdiction, is 
authorized on a proper showing to modify the 
decree in such particulars.j But a further 
essential to such relief and which is 
universally agreed upon, isj that there must 
be averments and proof of k change of 
circumstances or conditions of the parties. 
(Emphasis added) 
Moreover, because of the unique nature of real property and 
the complicated nature of its relation to such things as taxes 
-5-
insurance/ mortgages and title registration, the Courts have tended 
to require an enhanced showing of alteration in the material 
circumstances of the parties when a modification is sought which 
relates to real estate. 
In a case very much similar to that of the present/ the Utah 
State Supreme Court recently held: 
Where a disposition of real property is in 
question, however. Court should properly be 
more reluctant to grant a modification. In the 
interest of securing stability in titles, 
modifications in a Decree of Divorce making 
disposition of real property are to be granted 
only upon a showing of compelling reasons 
arising from a substantial and material 
change in circumstances. 
Foulger v. Foulger/ 626 P.2d 412 (Utah 1981). 
The Court in Foulger went on to hold that matters which are 
within the contemplation of the parties at the time of stipulation 
or divorce can hardly be thought of as circumstances sufficiently 
radical to justify modification. Specifically the Court stated "in 
the instant case, no such compelling reasons have been shown to 
exist which warrant the modification granted. Ma-tters such as 
payments on the home/ and maintenance and upkeep thereof/ certainly 
must have been within the plaintiff's contemplation at the time she 
agreed to the disposition set forth in the original Divorce 
Decree." 
It is clear that the defendant's burden/ under the facts of 
this case, required him to show that there had been, since the time 
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of the entry of the original divorce decree, significant and 
material changes in the circumstances cjf the parties. 
Additionally, since there was an agreement between the parties 
which involved real property, the defendant's burden is enhanced 
require that he show the following: 
(1) That there are compelling reasons arising from: 
(2) Substantial and 
(3) material changes in circumstances, 
(4) which were not within the contemplation of the 
parties at the time of any ptior stipulations, 
or agreements at the time of the divorce. 
The facts which the defendant presented to the trial court t 
sustain his burden were insufficient on all counts. The defendan 
having so failed, the trial court should have proceeded no furthe 
By continuing, it clearly abused its discretion in subsequently 
modifying the original order. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO MAKE A 
SHOWING TO JUSTIFY THE 
FINDINGS AND MODIFICATION 
(a) The Defendant Has Failed to 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENTIARY 
TRIAL COURT'S 
Demonstrate a Substantial 
Change of Material Circumstances Sincfe the Entry of the Decree o 
Divorce. 
In the short time span of about |2 1/2 years since the entry 
the Decree of Divorce, the Court has been subjected to no less t 
three Order to Show Cause hearings initiated by the defendant, a 
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based on substantially the same allegations of changed 
circumstances and all seeking to modify the real property 
arrangement which the parties originally stipulated to. 
In the first two Orders to Show Cause/ the Court held that the 
defendant had failed to show a sufficient change in material 
circumstances to warrant modification. In its memorandum submitted 
in support of the third petition for modification/ defendant's own 
counsel states that "the facts in this case have not substantially 
varied since the 31st day of March/ 1983/ at which time this matter 
was before the Court for hearing on defendant's motion to modify 
the decree to provide for reasonable rental on the home upon the 
basis that the income of the defendant had substantially reduced 
and plaintiff's income had increased. Plaintiff had also remarried 
since the divorce and was living in the home with her present 
husband." Thus, by the Court's finding and by the admission of 
defendant's own counsel, the facts in this case have not 
substantially varied since the time of the entry of the decree. 
This being the case there was not a sufficient bajsis for the Court 
to look further. 
In Gale v. Gale/ 123 Utah 277, 258 P.2d 986 (1953), the wife 
was awarded custody of the four minor children of the marriage and 
the husband ordered to pay child support at the monthly rate of 
$25.00 per child. Eighteen months later the wife sought an 
increase in child support to $35.00 per month, but the Court 
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refused even this seemingly reasonable request because the wife 
failed to demonstrate any change in circumstances. Citing to 
Chaffee v. Chaffee, 63 Utah 261, 225 P 76 (1924), the Gale Court 
supports the long standing principle in domestic law: 
The legal principle controlling in this case is 
that a divorce decree may not be modified unless 
it is alleged, proved and the trial court finds 
that the circumstances upon which it was based 
have undergone a substantial cjhange. (Emphasis 
added) 
Reiterating this same requirement aire the current cases of 
Haslam v. Haslam, 657 P.2d 757 (Utah 1982), and Leah v. Bowers, 651 
P.2d 1213 (Utah 1983), and those previously cited in Point I. 
As a consequence of divorce and the subsequent necessity of 
separate residences and maintenance, th 
likelihood that because of the division 
the divorce will experience a lower sta 
enjoyed as a family. As the Gale Court) 
is cut to fit two beds, it seldom will 
mere need on the side of one party or 
ere is a substantial 
of assets, each party to 
jndard of living than they 
stated, "when one blanket 
cover them both." Thus, 
he other is not the sole 
consideration and not even a primary consideration in the Court's 
review of a petition for modification. In this light, the 
defendant's contention that he is "in need" of his equity from th( 
home, is not sufficient justification to modify the decree. 
The showing of substantial and material change in 
circumstances is a requirement which npt only protects the Courts 
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from being overburdened by the constant rehashing of the 
circumstances relative to each party's situation subsequent to the 
divorce/ but also protects- the parties from harrassment/ paranoia 
in their daily affairs and "ping-pong" custody hearings. The need 
for the standard has often been recognized by the courts/ one of 
which proffered: 
Absent such a requirement/ a Decree of Divorce 
would be subject to ad infinitum appellate review 
and readjustment according to the concepts of 
equity held by succeeding trial judges. 
Foulger, 414. 
(b) The Defendant Has Not Presented Evidence Sufficient to 
Warrant Modification of the Stipulated Disposition of the Real 
Property Involved. 
In seeking to resolve the differences between the parties in 
the original divorce matter/ the parties discussed and agreed to 
certain matters/ one of which was the disposition of the home. 
This subject was dealt with at length in the findings of the Court 
and in paragraph 9 of the Decree as set forth in
 wits entirety 
above under Plaintiff's "Facts." 
At a subsequent Order to Show Cause hearing/ initiated by the 
defendant, seeking to alter the terms of paragraph 9/ the trial 
court found: 
In this matter the Court does not find a 
sufficient compelling reason to modify the 
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In the case of Callister v. Callisfter, 1 Utah.2d 34, 261 P 
944 (1953), the Utah court clearly recognized the sanctity of 
property settlements as distinguished from alimony settlements. 
making such a distinction, the Court cited to Hough v. Hough, 2 
Cal.2d 605, 160 P.2d 15 (1945) appearihq to adopt with approval 
following language therefrom: 
This does not mean that payments under property 
settlement agreements may be modified even though 
incorporated in the Decree. They may not. 
[Citations omitted] But in such a situation 
there is not the same policy. The settlement 
of property rights should be final in order to 
secure stability of titles. Support allowances 
on the other hand should be(subject to the 
discretion of the Court as Justice may • 
require... It has been loosely stated 
generally in passing that the divorce court has 
no jurisdiction to modify a decree based upon a 
property settlement agreement. [Citations 
omitted] However, that does not mean that the 
Court does not have jurisdiction on an 
application for modificatioh to decide 
correctly or incorrectly whether the Decree is 
based upon a property settlement agreement, and 
is not subject to modification, or is based 
upon alimony or support allowance covenants, 
and is subject to modif icatjion. " 
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This inflexible position as to property settlements has not 
been adopted in toto by the Utah Court/ but the Court has taken a 
position which requires that when one seeks to modify the 
provisions of a Divorce Decree relative to real property/ the 
burden he must carry is substantially greater than that which must 
be shown in seeking a modification of alimony or support. In 
Despain v. Despain/ 610 P.2d 1303, (Utah 1980), the plaintiff 
sought modification of a provision of the separation agreement by 
which the plaintiff relinquished "any and all other claims against 
the [defendant] so as to constitute a complete separation and 
division of the marital estate." In so doing, the plaintiff gave 
up any and all rights which she may have otherwise had to the value 
of a trust which had been set up by her husband. 
Upon motion, after nearly two years subsequent to the signing 
of the agreement and its incorporation into the Decree of Divorce, 
the plaintiff sought and the trial court granted an order requiring 
an accounting of the trust property and an award to the plaintiff 
of one half interest in the trust res. On appeal, the Supreme 
Court explained and held as follows: 
Under defendant's argument, plaintiff contracted away all 
rights to the trust res pursuant to paragraph 10 of the 
separation agreement and property settlement forged by 
the parties. In exchange for the $75,000.00 payment frorr 
defendant, asserts defendant, plaintiff relinquished "an}? 
and all other claims against the defendant." By 
defendant's view, the trial court, upon adopting the 
parties' agreement as part of the Decree of Divorce, 
became bound by its terms and may not now modify such 
terms. We agree. 
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This issue was most recently before the Court in 
Land v. Land/ [605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980)] wherein 
we observed that the outright abrogation of the 
provisions of a property settlement agreement is 
to be resorted to with great reluctance and only 
for compelling reasons. 
The Court went on to state "[I]n the absence of compelling 
equitable considerations/ the terms of the property settlement 
agreement are not to be abrogated"/ thus reversing the order 
requiring an accounting and division of| the trust res. (Emphasis 
added) 
This position was subsequently reijnforced in the Foulger cas< 
supra, wherein it was stated: 
Where a disposition of real property is in 
question/ however, courts should properly 
be more reluctant to grant a modification. 
In the interest of securing stability in 
titles/ modifications in a Decree of Divorce 
making disposition of real property are to 
be granted only upon a showipg of compelling 
reasons arising from a substantial and material 
change in circumstances. (Emphasis added) 
A review of the record will show that in each of the three 
times the defendant petitioned the trial court far a modification 
I 
the facts he alleged as constituting a substantial change of fact 
were pretty much the same. In the first two instances the Court 
found adequate and substantial reasons why the modification shou." 
not be granted/ yet/ at the third heading, with substantially th< 
same facts before the Court, and even with the defendant's own 
counsel admitting in his memo that "the facts in this case have 
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not substantially varied since the 31st day of March, 1983..."/ 
the Court somehow decided that the same facts constituted a 
change of circumstances. Under the facts, it is inconceivable to 
this plaintiff that such a finding could occur absent a finding of 
abuse of the trial court's discretion. 
Unless something can be said for persistence/ no circumstances 
have occured which would suffice under the legal requirements/ as 
set forth above/ to affect the property disposition as agreed upon 
by the parties and as decreed by the Court. It seems clear from 
the record and from the numerous instances in which the plaintiff 
has been required to respond to Orders to Show Cause that the 
defendant's motive in continuing this procession is to harass the 
plaintiff/ disrupt her life/ salve his bitter feelings about her 
new husband living in the residence/ which was once shared by them, 
to recant on the property agreement which he has now become 
disenchanted with, and to get his money out of the property as 
quickly as he can. His motives are made clear by the testimony 
given by him at the hearing held before Judge Sanv on March 31/ 
1983: 
Q. Now we came into court and entered into 
an agreement in September of last year that custody 
would be formerly [sic] changed and you were 
awarded custody of Jeff? 
A. Yes. 
Q. There were a lot of issues that were 
heard in September, why didn't you ask for support 
in September of last year? 
A. That was the same time that we came in 
and asked for the change of the equity in the home 
-14-
and I felt that I would get that scj> I didn't ask for 
child support, 
Q. After the Judge ruled and said that the 
home need not be sold or you need not be awarded 
any equity out of that/ that upset you did it not? 
A. Yes, because I felt that'even though the 
home was a part of both of us and ^hat we were 
separating at that time/ I thought, you know that 
is fine. As long as the home is left for my wife 
and my girls that is fine, but I will not have 
somebody else living in my home rent free and make 
more money than me. That is not right. 
Q. Well/ you withheld making payment for 
child support/ did you not? 
A. Yes sir I did. 
Q. We had to come back to qourt to get that 
straightened out did we not? 
A. Yes we did. 
Q. And it was concluded that your wife was 
correct in her record did we not? 
A. That is right. 
Q. And you had to pay that money did you not? 
A. Yes I did. 
Q. And that upset you did it not? 
A. Yes it did. 
Q. You are still upset and that is why you 
filed this current action it is not? 
A. That is not true. | 
Q. And you are going to be continaully upset 
until that house is sold? 
A. Well, I don't think I will really be 
continually upset but it does, it? bothers me to know 
that you got $18/500.00 sitting Inhere that is not 
making you any interest at all. It is not working 
for you/ it is not doing anything. 
Q. Well/ you have remarried have you not? 
A. Yes. 
(Transcript of the March 31, 1983 hearing, pp. 19-20) 
In light of this testimony and ib view of the numerous 
instances on which the defendant has petitioned the Court to ach 
his objectives/ which are contrary to the settlement agreement 
arrived at by the parties and adopteq by the Court/ this Court's 
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language in several instances speaks directly to this defendant. 
the case of LeBreton v. LeBreton, 604 P.2d 469 (Utah 1979), whic 
involved the reconsideration of a property distribution made in 
divorce decree, Justice Hall in his dissenting opinion stated: 
I am constrained to note that if matters of 
this type are to be viewed as within the 
continuing jurisdiction of the Court, any 
litigant, once satisfied with a stipulated 
divorce settlement, but becomes disenchanted 
therewith because of a change in market values, 
(up or down), need only appeal to the Court to 
give him a second chance by way of 
reformation. Such is not the law of contracts 
and should not be the law of "equity" as it 
pertains to decrees of divorce which divide 
property based upon stipulations. 
More succinctly and more recently, in the case of 
Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980), Justice Hall, this time 
writing for a unanimous court, stated forcefully: 
True it is that, in making a division of 
property by a decree of divorce a trial court 
is governed by general principles of equity. 
It is likewise true that the Court retains 
continuing jurisdiction over the parties and 
may modify the decree due to a change in 
circumstances, equitable considerations again 
to govern. It must, however, be added that, 
when a decree is based upon a property 
settlement agreement, forged by the parties and 
sanctioned by the Court, equity must take such 
agreement into consideration. Equity is not 
available to reinstate rights and privileges 
voluntarily contracted away simply because 
one has come to regret the bargain made. 
Accordingly, the law limits the continuing 
jurisdiction of the Court where property 
settlement agreement has been incorporated into 
the decree, and the outright abrogation of the 
provisions of such an agreement is only to be 
resorted to with great reluctance and for 
compelling reasons! (Emphasis added) 
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The facts stated by the defendant in support of his allegation 
of changed circumstances, do not come anywhere near the threshold 
of meeting the burden as set forth in the case law above. Were he 
seeking a modification of the alimony or child custody, the Court 
may have perhaps been within its bounds in modifying the decree. 
Under the present circumstances, however, the Court clearly 
misapplied the law and abused its discretion. 
(c) The Facts Which the DefendantjCites as Substantial 
Changes in Material Circumstances Are Changes Which Were Originall 
Contemplated By the Parties in Arriving)at the Stipulated Agreemen 
and Were Changes Which Were Reasonably Certain and Fixed. 
In arriving at terms in a divorce agreement or stipulation or 
either which are amenable to both sides it is understood that ther 
are possibilities for change in the future which should be dealt 
with as they arise. For instance, it is reasonably certain that < 
children grow their needs will increase. It is also reasonably 
certain that there will be income fluctuations to which each part 
might be subject and it is also certailn that collateral 
circumstances might create a situation where custody arrangements 
other than that provided in the divorce will be necessary. Becai 
of these natural changes which are reasonably certain to occur, t 
Court has imposed the standard of requiring a substantial change 
l 
material circumstances before any modification of the decree wil 
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be made. Otherwise, the Court would be subjected to a great number 
of modification hearings based on the flimsiest of excuses. 
In attempting to avoid this situation, the Court and the 
parties to the action are able to make provision in the decree 
aimed toward the resolution of future circumstances which are 
reasonably likely to occur. In order to eliminate one bone of 
contention which might have arisen between the parties to this 
action, they agreed to forego disputes over the real estate by 
making it possible for either party to buy out the other's equity 
and if that was not possible then after five years the house was to 
oe sold with the defendant getting his equity as fixed by the Court 
at the time of the Decree. During the interim the plaintiff was 
charged with making the payments on both the first and second 
mortgage on the home, keeping up the insurance, paying the taxes 
and maintaining the property. The plaintiff has assumed this 
obligation faithfully. It was, in fact, noted by the Court in its 
September 29, 1982 decision that the property "...in fact has been 
improved" through the efforts of the plaintiff. 
The two major conditions upon which the defendant claims he 
should be granted relief from the Decree are that the plaintiff has 
remarried and secondly that she has retired one of the two 
mortgages against the home by paying it off. Both of these 
circumstances were practically foregone conclusions at the time 
the parties entered the agreement. The latter of the two 
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conditions was fixed and certain and Judqe Sam himself/ in his 
September 29, 1982 decision again stated that "the parties were 
questioned by the Court and they indicated that they understood the 
stipulation, that both were dating and in fact considering 
carriage, and finally, that the stipulation was approved by the 
Court." (Emphasis added) 
I These conditions having been withim tne Knowledge of the 
parties at the time of the stipulation, it was implicit that shoul 
I 
the occurence of these conditions requite adjustments or provision 
such would have been handled within the language of the Decree or 
Stipulation. Because both parties expe(cted that any developments 
in this regard would have been handled at the time of the Decree 
and, moreover, assumed that any forsee^ble circumstances relative 
to the house would be dealt with by th£ language of the Decree, i 
is unfair for the defendant to now say' that these anticipated and 
foreseeable occurences constitute a change in material 
circumstances. Had the plaintiff soldi the house or had some othe 
circumstances as drastic as that occurjed in conjunction with her 
remarriage, it may have been appropriate for the Court to view tt 
as a substantial change in material circumstances sufficiently 
compelling to overcome the stipulation of the parties. But such 
not the case. 
Paragraph 9 of the Divorce Decrei^ which terms from the 
stipulation agreed to by the parties), was an integral part of t 
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division of the parties1 assets. It is only one of the many 
concessions and compromises that were necessary in order to 
resolve the marital differences between the parties in this case in 
amicable fashion. 
If one party is now able to invoke conditions and circumstances 
that were then foreseeable to the party as a changed circumstance, 
then the stipulation and the agreement was given by that party in 
bad faith, and preclude him from equitable treatment by the Court. 
Without clean hands, he is not deserving of equitable relief. As 
to the plaintiff, who has complied fully with the terms and 
conditions set down by the Decree of Divorce and as agreed to by 
the parties, should the Decree of Divorce and the conditions 
thereto not operate in her favor, then an estoppel ought to be 
available to her to prevent the defendant from interfering with her 
use and ownership of the property so long as she continues to 
maintain paying the mortgage, taxes, insurance and protects the 
defendants equity in the home. She has done all of this and 
relies upon his agreement that her right to use the home with no 
further obligations than those set out above would not be 
interfered with until August of 1986. That was the agreement as 
between the parties and that is the condition which the Court ought 
not to interfere with unless the plaintiff breaches her obligation 
in that regard or unless some other compelling, significant and 
material circumstance arises which would justify equitable relief. 
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The facts set forth by the defendant alleged to be material 
and substantial changes in circumstance kre not only indadequate in 
that regard but were circumstances which were apparent to and 
contemplated by the parties in their agreement with regard to the 
home. Therefore/ the facts set forth by the defendant ought not tc 
be recognized by the Court as substantial and material changes 
compelling enough to modify the original decree. 
POINT III 
SHOULD THE PLAINTIFF BE REQUIJRED TO PAY MONTHLY 
RENTAL TO THE DEFENDANT, T^E DEFENDANT WILL 
GET AN ENHANCED RECOVERY 
Pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Divorce Decree/ the defendant 
has been guaranteed that he will receive $18/500.00 from his 
equity in the home/ either by purchaseiby the plaintiff or pursuai 
I 
to its sale in 1986 as required by the Decree of Divorce. If the 
plaintiff is required to pay the defendant $70.00 per month renta 
in addition to guaranteeing that he wijll receive $18,500.00 upon 
sale of the home/ the defendant's tot41 recovery based on a rente 
period of 36 months, plus his equity/ will be $21,020.00. 
In effect/ should this Court affirm the trial court's 
decision/ the plaintiff will have been effectively penalized for 
(1) having remarried and (2) having been diligent in retiring th 
debt which encumbered the family home;. She has been diligent in 
making all payments with regard to the home and as aforemention€ 
has made improvements to the property which have increased the 
21 
value of the home. She has further sought to improve m 
herself and the children by remarrying. For having don 
Court now seeks to impose upon her that which is for al 
purposes a punishment. By so doing the Court also gran 
defendant an unwarranted boon. He makes no payments (m 
taxes, nor insurance) in regard to the house, he makes 
investment of time, labor or money in its maintenance, 
improvement, yet he is guaranteed a return of $18,500.0 
pursuant to order of the Court, an additional $2,520.00 
fees. 
Such an arrangement does not accord with the equit 
considerations which the Court should have given to the 
situation and such a "punitive" order ought to be overt 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant in this case has made great eff 
comply with the original order of the Court, which orde 
incorporated an agreement as stipulated to by the parti 
agreement was found to be amicable and equitable by the 
by the parties at the time of divorce. 
Any significant changes in circumstances which were certain 
and forseeable by the parties at that time should have been dealt 
with in the language of the agreement and decree. Those conditions 
and circumstances which were contemplated by the parties at the 
time of the agreement, the controversy of which were implicitly 
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Court and 
waived by the parties at the time of the agreement should have not 
later been considered by the trial court as material circumstances 
which could be invoked to alter the terifis of the original divorce 
decree. 
In short/ the trial court abused its discretion and misapplie 
the law when it allowed the defendant tfo modify the decree on a 
showing of facts which did not even apdroach the threshold of the 
burden which the defendant was required to meet. The basis for hi 
petition which sought a modification oif the decree did not allege 
facts which constituted compelling reasons arising from substanti< 
and material changes in circumstance. 
Since it was a stipulation as agreed to by the parties and t 
I 
Court and dealt with real property, th|e Court should have require 
a more significant showing than was presented. Its failure to sc 
require was a manifest abuse of discretion/ a misapplication of t 
law and was in disregard of the equities which ought to prevail j 
these hearings when and if the circumstances warrant its 
invocation. 
Plaintiff-appellant therefore seeks that this Court overtur 
the judgment of the lower Court and order dismissal of the 
defendants Order to Show Cause. 
DATED this day of 
DQN R. PETERSEN, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appe. 
June, 1984, 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true 
has been mailed/ postage prepaid/ 
for defendant, 43 East 200 North, 
this /&$ day of June, 1984. 
and correct copy of the foregoing 
to Michael D. Esplin, attorney 
P.O. Box "L", Provo, Utah 84603, 
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